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Interpreting management accounting rules – an initial study of public bodies 
 
Abstract 
Much has been written on the potentially institutionalized nature of management accounting 
practices in the past decade or so. In particular, the interactions of rules and routines, over 
time, provide explanations for the stable or changing nature of management accounting. 
Recent work has focused more on the conceptual nature of routines in particular. This paper 
will focus on an organizational environment where rules are more prevalent and explore the 
role of rules in rules/routines interactions. Such studies focusing on rules are lacking in the 
extant literature. This paper provides some evidence from initial interviews at two Irish local 
authorities which have recently changed internal costing systems at the behest of central 
government. Management accounting rules were forced upon the local authority by an 
external party (central government), and we explore how these rules were interpreted by 
actors, and thus can become routinized. This interpretation led us to examine the notions of 
formal versus informal rules. Based on the empirical evidence we propose a more detailed 
interaction of rules and routines which bring about potentially institutionalized management 
accounting practices than that proposed in extant literature.   
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) have provided many management accounting researchers (see for 
example, Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman 2004; Hassan 2005; Lukka 2007; Ribeiro and 
Scapens 2006; Soin, Seal & Cullen 2002; Spraakman 2006) with a useful framework to 
interpret change and stability in and around management accounting practices. Their 
framework draws on the interactions of rules and routines over time to explain change or 
stability of management accounting practices. It does not, however, explore these rule/routine 
interactions in detail.  
 
The particular focus of this paper is management accounting rules, and how they may interact 
with routines. Empirical work on the role of rules in management accounting change/stability 
is scarce, with more work done on routines (see for example, Quinn 2011; van der Steen 
2011). Quinn (2011) has provided some thoughts on management accounting rules, 
proposing rules must be documented in some fashion. While written rules are not a specific 
requirement of Burns and Scapens (2000), Quinn (2011) argues that conceiving rules as 
written is more suited to the majority of management accounting contexts. He does however 
concede that some organizations are likely to have more formalized and rules-based 
management accounting practices. As noted, empirical studies on more ‘rules-based’ 
management accounting are scarce, and it could be argued that our research on rules in the 
rule/routine interactions to bring about management accounting change is incomplete. But 
what type of organization might be regarded as one where management accounting rules are 
likely to be more prevalent? In this paper we explore two Irish local authorities, where 
management accounting practices are dictated by central government policy which is written 
- either as legislation or government policy documents. Thus, in such an organization, we can 
study the role of rules in management accounting change/stability. Our research objective is 
thus to interpret management accounting rules in an empirical setting, and in particular, 
ascertain in greater detail the interactions of management accounting rules and routines as 
originally set out by Burns and Scapens (2000). As noted by Quinn (2011), Burns and 
Scapens (2000) does not provide much detail of these interactions and we hope this work 
adds to that of both Burns and Scapens (2000) and Quinn (2013, 2011), by augmenting 
knowledge of the role of rules in rule/routine interactions in a management accounting 
setting. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section Two provides an overview of the 
theory underpinning the present study, by exploring extant literature. We draw particularly on 
the work of Burns and Scapens (2000), and some conceptual refinements suggested by Quinn 
(2011). This is necessary to set the groundwork for later sections of the paper. This section 
also sets out some conceptualizations of (management accounting) rules, as the conceptual 
nature of rules has not been fully explored in management accounting literature. Section 
Three describes some findings from initial interviews at the local authority. The final section 
discusses these findings in the context of the relationship of rules and routines as outlined by 
Burns and Scapens (2000) and Quinn (2011), as well as proposes a sequence of events to 
conceptualize how management accounting rules and routines may interact in a more rules-
based environment.  
 
2. Review of literature 
As noted in the introduction, Burns and Scapens (2000) has been the impetus for many 
studies of management accounting change. Management accounting change can be (and has 
been) studied from many theoretical perspectives, and as van der Stede (2011) notes, is 
hardly a new phenomenon. Before focusing on the specific approach adopted here, some of 
the key approaches used to study change and stability in management accounting are now 
briefly outlined. 
 
First, various branches of institutional theory have been adopted by researchers. A number of 
old institutional economics informed studies have provided evidence of how management 
accounting practices can change, although exhibiting a taken-for-granted nature (see for 
example, Burns  2000; Burns and Scapens  2000; Coad and Cullen 2006; Lukka 2007; Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens 2005; Soin et al. 2002). New institutional sociology has also been 
adopted to explain management accounting change in response external influences such as 
political pressures, regulatory changes and cultural factors (see for example, Collier 2001; 
Modell 2003; Nor-Aziah and Scapens 2007; Tsamenyi, Cullen and Gonzalez 2006). Several 
studies using institutional phenomena such as rules and routines have also been undertaken 
(see for example, Burns 2000; Burns and Scapens 2000; Quinn 2013, 2011; van der Steen 
2011, 2009). Second, structuration theory has been used to analyze change and stability in 
accounting systems. Recent examples include work by Coad and Herbert (2009) and Jack and 
Kholeif (2008), but as described by Englund, Gerdin and Burns (2011), structuration theory 
has been used in accounting research for the past 25 years or so. Third, actor network theory 
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has also been used to study management accounting change, although possibly less so than 
structuration or institutional approaches. Some examples include Alcouffe, Berland and 
Levant (2008), Dechow & Mouritsen (2005) and Lowe (2000). 
 
As noted, our objective is to further interpret the interactions of rules and routines in an 
empirical setting. This paper is thus positioned as a study of the more micro-phenomena 
within institutions, that is, rules and routines and draws on the old institutional economics 
underpinnings of Burns and Scapens (2000). This study is less suited to the more macro 
underpinnings of theories such as structuration theory and actor network theory. Bearing in 
mind the theoretical underpinnings of Burns and Scapens (2000), the remainder of this 
section will first detail Burns and Scapens (2000) and some recent contributions to their 
work. Then, broader literature on rules is detailed. As noted earlier, research in management 
accounting literature on rules is less common, and to interpret how rules interact with 
routines as set out in our research objective, we need to understand their conceptual nature. 
 
2.1 Rules and routines in management accounting 
 
The work of Burns and Scapens (2000) has been used as a starting point by many scholars 
who adopt the concepts of rules and routines in management accounting research. A key 
assumption of Burns and Scapens (2000) is that change and/or stability in management 
accounting can be interpreted using phenomena such as rules and routines. They define 
routines as “the way things are done” (2000, p. 5), and rules as “the ways things should be 
done” (2000, p. 6). They also recognize a link between institutions and actors, proposing that 
institutions define relations between social groups and group members. They present the 
realms of institution and action within their framework, and these, in turn, represent an “on-
going cumulative process of change through time” (2000, p. 9). Burns and Scapens’ 
framework starts with the encoding of “institutional principles into rules and routines” (2000, 
p. 10). This is typically influenced by existing rules and routines, which embrace existing 
institutional values. Rules (incorporating existing routines) are then enacted, and over time, 
repeated behavior forms routines and/or generates new routines which may become 
institutionalized. Over time too, new institutions may evolve which will be interpreted in 
terms of existing rules and routines; that is, there is a potential for change to occur to 
management accounting from within an organization. Burns and Scapens (2000) paint a 
5 
 
picture of slower, longer-term, evolutionary change as rules and routines interact over an 
extended period of time.  
 
Quinn (2011), based primarily on the work of Feldman and Pentland (2003), raised some 
potential issues around the ontology of rules and routines as set out by Burns and Scapens 
(2000). On routines, drawing on the work of Feldman and Pentland (2003), Quinn (2011) 
proposed that management accounting routines can be conceived as having two dimensions, 
namely an ostensive dimension and a performative dimension. Feldman and Pentland (2003) 
describe these dimensions as follows: the ostensive dimension of a routine “may have a 
significant tacit component” which molds the perception of what the routine is, “may be 
codified as a standard procedure” and “may exist as a taken-for-granted norm” (2003, p. 
101); the performative dimension of a routine is “the specific action(s) taken by people […] 
when engaged in an organizational routine” (Feldman and Pentland  2003, p. 102) “at specific 
times, in specific places” (Pentland and Feldman 2008, p. 286). Quinn (2011) adopted the 
ostensive/performative conceptualization of routines based on an apparent lack of any 
documented rules at a case company. Without rules, he questioned could routines portray a 
structural quality i.e. a guiding and referring function for actions (Quinn 2011). His solution 
is to conceive routines as consisting of an ostensive and performative dimension (as 
described above), with the ostensive component of a routine providing the structure. Quinn 
proposes some modifications to Burns and Scapens (2000), as per Figure 1.  
 
Quinn (2011) assumes rules are documented and need not exist. Rules are thus portrayed as 
artifacts of routines which may, if present interact with ostensive routines. If management 
accounting rules exist in a particular setting, then it is possible that the ostensive dimension of 
a routine is formalized as a documented rule. However, it is also possible that the ostensive 
dimension is at variance with rules or, as mentioned, that rules are not present. Thus, the 
interaction between rules and the ostensive dimension of a routine is tentative – hence the 
dotted lines. Thus, rules may be a visible representation (i.e. an artifact) of the ostensive 
dimension of routines, as the latter is not directly visible (Becker 2004; Pentland & Feldman 
2008, p. 288) and where rules do not exist, the ostensive dimension shapes perceptions of 
what routines mean or how they relate to action in particular circumstances (Feldman and 
Pentland 2003, p. 101). For example, management accountants may understand the month-
end routine(s) in their respective organization, without necessarily having any (documented) 
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rules. They are guided thus by the ostensive dimension of routines to interpret what needs to 
be done at month-end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
OR   = ostensive routine  
A  = encoding 
B  = enacting of performative routine  
C  = repetition of performative routine in time and space 
D  = institutionalization 
 
Figure 1 - the process of institutionalization of management accounting practices 
(Quinn, 2011) 
 
Quinn (2011) is broadly similar to Burns and Scapens (2000) and supports their underlying 
process. However, with reference to Figure 1, lines B and C represent the performative 
dimension of a routine, which is a refinement of the interactions of rules, routines and action 
Institutions: taken for granted assumptions 
               Actions                Actions  Time 
OR 
 
 
    
Artefacts (Rules) 
 
OR 
 
 
 
     Artefacts (Rules) 
A 
D A 
B B B 
C C 
C 
C C 
B B B 
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as originally set out by Burns and Scapens (2000). The performative dimension is thus 
carried out against a background of rules (if present) and/or an understanding of what is 
expected (i.e. the ostensive dimension), as depicted by line B. While referring to the ostensive 
dimension of a routine and/or to rules following the logic of Feldman and Pentland (2003), 
each particular acting-out of a routine has the potential to be relatively stable or result in 
potentially novel action, as depicted by a wavy line C. The degree of divergence in the 
performative routine may vary, from minor to reinvention (Pentland and Feldman 2005), 
implying change may range on a spectrum from relative stability to a new way of doing 
things. Thus, as Feldman and Pentland argue, the performative dimension of routines 
maintain and modify the ostensive dimension (2003, p. 107). Thus, repeated performance of a 
routine (i.e. action) maintains it (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Even if routines remain in 
existence in artifact form (as a rule) after any performance of associated routines dissipates 
(Pentland and Feldman 2008, 2005), then while the ostensive dimension by definition still 
exists it may have little or no meaning (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Thus, to maintain a 
routine with meaning in a particular context, the performative dimension requires regular 
enactment (Feldman and Pentland 2003, p. 108). On the other hand, on-going performances 
of routines may modify them. The performative dimension may vary in response to reflection 
by actors or external changes (c.f. Burns and Scapens 2000). Such changes may, over time, 
modify the ostensive routine – as depicted by multiple sets of lines B and C. Such changes 
are likely to be minor, but may also be more substantial in nature causing a shift to a new and 
accepted way of doing things, as depicted by arrow D. Finally, if the ostensive routine is 
changed through on-going variations in the performative dimension, then any associated 
rules/artifacts may be amended to reflect the changed understanding of the ostensive 
dimension. 
 
While Quinn (2011) does not dismiss rules as an essential component of the institutionalized 
nature of management accounting, he does propose as follows: 
 
“[...] if rules are artifacts of routines, then by definition routines should exist before 
rules. Or, more accurately, the ostensive dimension of a routine would tend to exist 
prior to a rule. This is not to say that routines must always exist prior to rules. Actions 
do not necessarily have to be repeated to be written as a formalized rule or artifact e.g. 
legislation. However, in management accounting it is more likely that routines will 
exist before being formalized as rules” (p. 348). 
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In essence Quinn (2011), while not dismissing rules as a component of Burns and Scapens’ 
framework, nor dismissing them as important in management accounting, suggests routines 
are more likely to be in existence before rules i.e. rules are artifacts of routines. While this 
may be the case in some circumstances, it is unlikely to hold in all cases. Quinn (2011) 
acknowledges that management accounting in some organizations may indeed have rules in 
advance of routines, citing public sector organizations as an example. A further point, which 
Quinn (2011) does not explore is the distinction between formal and informal rules. The 
framework presented in Figure 1 above proposes management accounting rules are best 
viewed as “formal” i.e. written. Quinn (2011) seems to prefer the concept of an ostensive 
routine over an informal (non-written) rule, but does acknowledge that they may be similar 
concepts (p. 349). He does not however make any proposals as to when, how or why they 
may be similar concepts or how informal rules and routines might “link” together in the 
interactions of rules and routines as set out by Burns and Scapens (2000). Oliveira (2010) 
places a greater emphasis on the importance of rules in management accounting and defends 
the importance of informal rules. However, neither Quinn nor Oliveira studied organizations 
where management accounting tasks are more likely to be formalized and written in some 
way, or more rule-like than routine-like e.g. public sector organizations. This is not to say 
that all public sector organizations are more formalized in the way they do things, nor is it 
saying that no formalization (formal rules) exists in private sector organizations. However, 
public sector organizations are more likely associated with actions which are determined by, 
or constrained by written rules, and this paper will use such an organization as an empirical 
base (see Section 3). As will be revealed in Section 3, our review of literature on rules and the 
empirical data required us to consider both formal and informal rules to interpret the 
interactions of rules and routines and in a more rules-based management accounting 
environment. 
 
2.2 Extant literature on rules 
 
As portrayed in Section 2.1, it is largely accepted in the management accounting literature, 
that both rules and routines play an important part in the interpretation of management 
accounting change and stability (Burns and Scapens 2000; Quinn 2011). However, much of 
the extant research has concentrated less on rules and more on routines. As we focus more on 
rules, it is important to pin down the concept as best possible. Thus, we now detail extant 
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literature, primarily outside management accounting, in an effort to pin down the conceptual 
nature of rules.  
 
In general, rules can be broadly described as either formal or informal (Hodgson 2006; 
Kingston and Caballero 2009; North 1990). As noted previously, the extant management 
accounting literature has not provided much detailed discussion on the nature of rules.  Some 
rules-related works, for example Burns & Scapens (2000), Burns (2000), Quinn (2011) and 
Scapens (1994) while mentioning and adopting the notion of rules, do not provide much 
detail on their ontological nature. However, the institutional economics literature, which is 
drawn upon by both Scapens (1994) and Burns & Scapens (2000), provides some useful 
notions of the term “rules”. Searle describes rules as regulative (such as traffic rules) or 
constitutive (such as the rules of chess), the latter being termed a rule “when the procedure or 
practice […] becomes regularized” (2005, p. 9). North (1990) defines institutions as 
including both formal rules such as laws and constitutions, and informal constraints such as 
conventions and norms1. Pelikan (2003) describes two kinds of rules; rules-routines and rule-
constraints. Rules-routines guide step-by-step behavior, possibly as a function of past and 
present conditions, whereas rules-constraints “set limits to possibly large varieties of 
permissible behaviors and actions, but usually not as severe as to permit only one specific 
behavior” (2003, p. 244). Rule-constraints are presented as formal (e.g. laws), whereas rule-
routines are informal (2003, pp. 245-249). Hodgson describes rules as “socially transmitted 
and customary normative injunctions or immanently normative dispositions, that in 
circumstances X, do Y” (2006, p. 18), but avoids any further refinement into formal or 
informal properties. Hodgson further suggests conventions (c.f. North 1990) are particular 
instances of rules (2006, p. 18). The literature mentioned presents the possibility that rules 
may be written or formalized as an artifact or unwritten. Hodgson (2006, p. 18) states: 
 
Many writers attempt distinctions between “formal” or “informal” institutions or 
rules. However, these terms have been used misleadingly and in different ways. Does 
the term formal mean legal, written, explicit, codifiable, or something else? The 
ambiguities surrounding these terms mean that they cannot be taken for granted. One 
is required to specify more clearly what is meant in each case or use more transparent 
terms such as legal, non-legal, and explicit instead (emphasis in original). 
 
                                                 
1 See Kingston and Caballero (2009) 
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Reynaud (2005) provides a useful distinction between rules and routines. Reynaud (2005) 
provides three key differences: 1) rules are arrangements awaiting interpretation, whereas 
routines are rules already interpreted; 2) rules are explicit, routines are implicit, and; 3) 
routines are “a form of pragmatic resolution”, whereas rules give a “theoretical, abstract and 
general response” (p. 866). An interesting point made by Reynaud (2005) is that routines are 
interpretations of rules. This “interpretation” is a key point. If a routine is an interpretation of 
a rule, thus the “interpretation” may be conceptually similar in nature to the ostensive routine 
as proposed by Feldman and Pentland (2003). This begs the question, is the interpretation of 
a rule then an internalized interpretive structure? Or, in simpler language is the interpretation 
an informal rule. 
 
Morgen and Olsen (2011) propose rules are “fluid”. By drawing on Searle (2005) and the 
works of Hodgson (2006), Morgen and Olsen (2011) propose it “would be a misinterpretation 
of constitutive rules to conceive of them as fixed” (p. 12). They argue that over time, rules 
and rule systems (institutions) can and do change in response to external events and action, 
for example. Briefly, Morgen and Olsen (2011) introduce the notion of a mezzo rule, which is 
a recodification of existing rules. This concept is an interesting one in that it is a “useful way 
of linking fluidity within rules to the critical awareness of the agent that follows, breaks, 
bends, and transforms rules” (p.4). Thus, as suggested by the term, mezzo rules are “half-
way” between constitutive and regulative rules as proposed by Searle (2005). Arguably then, 
mezzo rules are both formal and informal. 
 
Given the varying interpretations of rules, we take a lead from Hodgson (2006) in that we 
attempt to clarify their nature, as relevant to a management accounting context. First, we 
adopt the meaning of formal rules, at least in a management accounting context, in a similar 
vein to Quinn (2011) i.e. formal rules are written or documented. Second, the meaning of 
informal rules is less clear in the extant literature. While perhaps not the most scientific 
starting point, the word “informal” is described in the Online Oxford English Dictionary2 as: 
 
Not done or made according to a recognized or prescribed form; not observing 
established procedures or rules; unofficial; irregular. 
 
Characterized by absence of formality or ceremony; casual, relaxed. 
 
                                                 
2 This dictionary is available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
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The word “rule” is described as follows: 
A principle regulating practice or procedure; a fixed and dominating custom or habit. 
A principle, regulation, or maxim governing individual conduct. 
 
Taking the above definition of informal first, a key element of the definition is “not observing 
established procedures or rules”. Thus, drawing on the language of Burns and Scapens 
(2000), it could be argued that routines (the way things are done) are informal in nature. 
However, looking at the definition of a rule above, things become more formal in that some 
“practice”, “procedure” or “regulation” is a core element of the definition – which seems to 
be supported by some extant literature (see for example Hodgson 2006; Pelikan 2003). A 
rule, however, in the general sense defined above, does not imply action; a point which is 
also echoed by Burns and Scapens (2000) (rules are the way things should be done) and 
Quinn (2011) (rules are written). Again, in a general sense, “informal” does not imply action 
- “not done or made according to a recognized or prescribed form” as per the dictionary 
definition above. Thus, drawing on Morgen and Olsen’s (2011) notion, an informal rule may 
be conceived as a fluid rule. This fluidity is an internal cognitive structure in the mind of the 
actor and is not “real” action. Therefore, we define an informal rule as a cognitive 
interpretation of a formalized written rule. Using this definition, an informal rule may have 
some similarities with the ostensive routine as mentioned earlier - both are tacit in nature, 
both may change over time. However, it is proposed here that a difference between an 
informal rule and an ostensive routine is in the very notion of routines implying repeated 
action3. Rules, as proposed by Quinn (2011) and Feldman and Pentland (2003) may indeed be 
artifacts in that they are a representation of, for example, desired or undesired behaviors. The 
existence of rules does not however necessarily imply repeated behavior (routines). On the 
other hand, actors may be aware of rules and never have the need or opportunity to apply 
them, hence arguably routines do not exist. Thus, it could be argued that the ostensive routine 
cannot by definition exist until some repeated actions have occurred so that a tacit 
understanding of “what to do” can be formed in the mind of an actor. While, the “what to do” 
can be formed through education and training e.g. professional accounting course, or through 
individual habits becoming collective routines over time, in more rules-based organizations 
(such as public sector organizations) it is more likely that informal rules may precede any 
ostensive routine. Thus, the sequence of events compared to that in Figure 1 may be altered in 
                                                 
3It is generally accepted that repetition is a necessary constituent of routines (see Becker (2008, 2004) for a 
useful summary). 
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such organizations, as follows: 1) a formal (written) rule is introduced to the organization, 
e.g. new legislation, guidelines or regulations; 2) actors within the organization interpret 
these formal rules, which may take on a fluid quality and “bend”. Thus, informal rules are 
formed as cognitive structures; 3) the informal rules are acted out, which over time may 
develop into routines by virtue of repetition (Pentland 2011), and; 4) finally these routines 
may, over time, influence the formation of new routines, which may be formalized as written 
(formal) rules. 
 
In summary, it is proposed here that informal rules may precede routines in certain 
organizational contexts, or indeed may exist only as a cognitive structure and never become a 
routine as such - this of course presupposes a formal rule exists e.g. legislation or written 
guidelines. This interpretation may be particularly suited to organizations where management 
accounting practices are more formalized and/or dictated by external parties4. The next 
section recounts the evidence from two such organizations, Bravo Local Authority and 
Charlie Local Authority.  
 
3. Empirical evidence – Bravo and Charlie Local Authorities 
 
The remit of Irish local authorities such as County and City Councils is to supply services 
such as water and sewage facilities, housing, roads, planning, public libraries and fire 
services. Each authority is headed by the County/City Manager or an elected Mayor. The two 
local authorities researched in this study, Bravo and Charlie Local Authorities (hereafter 
BLA, CLA) are typical of any Irish local authority in the services they provide within their 
geographical area. Financial data, such as monetary spend, is not given here for 
confidentiality reasons. 
 
3.1 Data and Methods 
The present research is based on an initial study at two local authorities, BLA and CLA, and 
an interpretative approach is adopted (Ahrens and Dent 1998; Lukka 2007; Scapens 1990). 
As the primary objective is to further our understanding of the interaction of rules and 
routines in management accounting, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 
Head of Finance and management accountants at both BLA and CLA. A total of six 
                                                 
4 In most cultural contexts, internal management accounting practices of private organizations are not regulated 
in the same way as financial accounting practices.  
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interviews were undertaken during 2011 and 2012, each lasting on average 60-90 minutes – 
at CLA we interviewed two management accountants, one senior, one junior; at BLA we 
interviewed the Head of Finance and one management accountant (see Appendix 1). Outline 
questions were sent to all interviewees in advance, and open-ended questions were used 
allowing interviewees to detail their opinions on events surrounding management accounting 
systems and practices. This allowed areas of interest to be explored in greater detail than 
would normally be possible (Adam and Healy 2000). All interviews were digitally recorded 
and transcribed to facilitate analysis. Additionally, we had access to internal documents such 
as costing manuals, presentations and training manuals. These documents provided some 
degree of triangulation of information gleaned from the interviews, and in some cases 
provided greater detail.  
 
Interview transcripts were analyzed manually to identify management accounting rules and 
routines from the descriptions of management accounting practices as revealed by the 
empirical evidence. In the analysis, we adopted the definition of routines as set out by Quinn 
(2011). Rules are defined as set out in Section 2 i.e. formal rules are written in some way, 
informal rules are a cognitive interpretation of a formalized written rule. We used these 
interpretations of rules to analyze the empirical data in an effort to map out the interactions of 
rules and routines – see Section 4 later.  
 
3.2 Towards a new cost accounting system  
The original costing system which existed at BLA and CLA from the late 1970’s was similar 
to that used in all Irish local authorities at that time. It was a programme group-based system 
which comprised of eight programme groups numbered 1 to 8 (see Appendix 2), and a central 
management charge which can be defined as “central costs, which cannot be directly related 
to a particular service but which form part of the total costs of delivering services” (Local 
Authority Costing Manual p.7, 20065). All direct costs of provision of services such as 
housing, roads, water, development, environmental protection, recreation and amenity, 
education, health and welfare and miscellaneous services were captured in programme groups 
1 to 8. The costs related to central management charge was not captured in these eight 
programme groups, nor was there an allocation of the central management charge to any of 
these programme groups. 
                                                 
5 This definition is from the most recent manual, as no copies of the original manual were available at BLA. 
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The original costing system was driven by a manual of guidelines provided by central 
government in 1976: 
 
The rules from government are very much the statutory documentation that goes 
around and tells you how the information is to be presented and the categorization of 
it. The original costing system was guided by a generic guideline from 1976, which 
you interpreted yourself (Head of Finance, BLA). 
 
It is a statutory document so the document would always have been there (Senior 
Management Accountant, CLA). 
 
However, despite these costing guidelines from central government, the Head of Finance at 
BLA and the senior management accountant at CLA respectively commented on issues 
surrounding these original guidelines: 
  
One of the difficulties that occurred was that as the services in local authorities 
evolved over time, individuals within the organizations made their own sort of 
decisions as to where the service costs best sat on the costing manual […] the initial 
guidelines were not detailed enough (Head of Finance, BLA). 
  
We had discretion at local level as to how we would use the coding system and 
provided it fitted into the national system of programme budgeting, well, that was fine 
(Senior Management Accountant, CLA). 
 
As the services provided by each local authority in Ireland expanded differently over time, 
each individual local authority developed their own localized costing practices and ways of 
doing things; in effect, they interpreted the guidelines within the costing manual to suit their 
own organization. According to the management accountant at BLA “The costing manual 
tells you what to do and we stick by that except for the parts open to interpretation”. This 
practice of self-interpretation was facilitated by the Department of Environment’s6 (DOE) 
lack of direct operational control over local authorities. The DOE’s role is to implement 
government policies and to oversee the operation of local government systems. By the late 
1990’s, the end result of 20 years of self-autonomous management accounting by local 
authorities was the presentation of annual budgets which proved less than ideal in terms of 
analysis to the DOE. Thus, the DOE could not rely on the consistency of costing processes 
across all Irish local authorities and it was unclear as to the true costs of the services 
provided, as recounted by the Head of Finance at BLA: 
                                                 
6 The Department of Environment is the central government body responsible for all local authorities in Ireland. 
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If you looked at what does the water service cost you, as a simple example, they were 
getting huge variances between one authority and another. 
  
As highlighted by the above quotation, the varying interpretations of the original costing 
manual/guidelines in local authorities lead to ambiguities for the DOE. Therefore, in 1996 the 
“Better Local Government” initiative called for an improved financial monitoring system 
which aimed to 1) identify the full costs of service delivery by each local authority; 2) 
compare the service costs of similar activities over time; and, 3) use appropriate output 
measures to determine service unit costs. According to the Local Authority Costing Manual 
(2006, p.4)7, “the objective of the costing manual is to set out guidelines that will ensure 
comparability and consistency of costing data across local authorities”. In March 2005, a 
pilot project commenced to identify and develop an appropriate costing system for local 
authorities, with Kilkenny County Council acting as the pilot site. The pilot project 
recommended that a form of Activity Based Costing (ABC) was most appropriate. This new 
ABC-type costing system was rolled out to all local authorities across Ireland from January 
2008. To accompany the rollout, a new costing manual was published in 2006, serving a 
number of functions: 
 
 it standardized service and sub-service definitions 
 provided a definition of total service costs 
 defined the main expense groups comprising total gross costs 
 identified the costs to be included in the central management charge (CMC) 
 standardized the basis for allocating the CMC charge 
 provided guidance on expenditure and activities to be included in each sub-service. 
 
Services are the key reporting segment of local authorities and each service will normally 
have a number of sub-services. For example the Housing and Building Division will have a 
service called Maintenance /Improvement of Housing Units and this service will have a 
number of sub services. Table 1 below, provides an extract of typical services and sub-
services as envisaged by the 2006 costing manual (see Appendix 2 for the full list of services 
and sub-services). It should also be noted that the Better Local Government initiative also 
                                                 
7 Although the Better Local Government initiative began in 1996, it was 2006 before a new version of the 
costing manual materialized. 
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introduced the concept of accruals-based accounting to Irish local authorities, but they are not 
bound by financial reporting standards. 
 
Table 1 – extract from Local Authority Costing manual  
A - Housing and Building Division 
Ref Service Ref Revised Sub Services 
A01 Maintenance/Improvement 
of LA Housing Units 
A0101 
 
 
A0102 
 
 
A0103 
 
 
A0104 
 
A0199 
Maintenance of LA Housing 
Units 
 
Maintenance of Traveller 
Accommodation Units 
 
Traveller Accommodation 
Management 
 
Estate Maintenance 
 
Service Support Costs 
 
According to all interviewees, in both local authorities compared to the costing manual issued 
in the late 1970’s, the main impact of the new 2006 costing manual was to rename 
programme groups 1-8 to division A-H. The term “programme group” was now renamed a 
“division”, the programme, renamed “service”, with “sub-service” as appropriate (see 
Appendix 3). Additionally, an apportionment of the central management charge to services 
(i.e. Division A through to Division H) had to be undertaken for the first time.  
 
In 2007, the BLA and CLA initiated a project to adopt the new ABC-type costing system. 
They used the 2006 costing manual to identify the main central management charge (CMC) 
drivers such as pension costs, information systems, law, human resources and finance. They 
apportioned these central costs out to the various service cost codes (i.e. services such as 
roads, housing) in accordance with the costing manual. For example, finance was apportioned 
based on the number of finance transactions, human resources was apportioned based on the 
number of staff, and so on. The project implementation team in both local authorities gave 
presentations to the local authority manager, accountants and to the management team to 
provide them with an explanation and understanding as to why the new costing approach had 
to be implemented. According to the management accountant at BLA and CLA respectively: 
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We met all the staff and I did a presentation to all the areas (BLA). 
 
A very good training programme was embarked on by a lot of people in CLA so that 
they understood exactly where their local authority was going with its new costing 
process (CLA). 
 
A major change resulting from the implementation of the new costing system was a new 
budgeting approach, which contained more detailed information than previous budgets. In 
particular, costs were reclassified in a more appropriate way according to the services which 
consumed the cost. Thus, more accurate service cost information was available to top 
management, as the management accountant at BLA noted: 
 
So I suppose for the first time local authorities could identify the full cost of service 
provision. These new reports allowed all costs to be seen clearer. The costing system 
gave formal rules and we were able to use them informally to make changes internally 
to achieve greater efficiency. 
 
 
This view was also noted by the Head of Finance at BLA: 
 
The fundamental change in the new system is the introduction of a method of 
apportioning overhead, and drivers for each type of overhead. This means that at least 
you are apportioning overhead on a standard basis, whereas before every authority 
had it up to themselves. Most of them were apportioning based on expenditure, so the 
higher your expenditure the more overhead you picked up, and this really didn’t 
reflect activity. So if we spend €10 million on a once off payment that didn’t require 
any work or any involvement. That picked up a huge amount of overhead. Whereas 
the new system tries to reflect where overhead is actually being consumed and used in 
any circumstance. 
 
The management accountant at BLA also noted that the complexity of service provision at 
the authority implied that even with the newer, more standardized (2006) approach to 
allocating costs, some interpretation of the rules was still required: 
 
Although it was very technical in the beginning, anything that was not in the manual 
we were given was open to interpretation, to human interpretation, of where costs 
were to go […] and the fear was, if our interpretation of the rules was very different 
from another authority, we would come out as being inefficient, even though we are 
not - just because our interpretation is different.  
 
The senior management accountant at CLA indicated they followed the guidelines more 
rigorously, but some interpretation of the rules was still necessary in some circumstances: 
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We always had a system here of monitoring our activities, obviously as given our size 
we have to have a system of control that is appropriate to our size and complexity. So 
we would have had very rigorous processes here of expenditures and sign off within 
departments. Just maybe slight differences due to interpretation or services other 
authorities don’t provide.  
 
In summary, the empirical data reveals a management accounting environment driven largely 
by formal rules set out in various guidelines or similar over a period of 30 years or more. 
Problems implementing these formal rules are also mentioned, which suggests that prior to 
new management accounting practices becoming routinized, some form of cognitive 
interpretation of the rules occurred. That is, an informal rule formed, which in turn may have 
become a routine over time through repeated action (see Pentland 2011 for a full discussion 
of the necessary components of an organizational routine). Both BLA and CLA, like all Irish 
local authorities, had their original costing and budgeting structure driven by statutory 
guidelines issued by central government. These were written, formalized guidelines which 
were issued to every Irish local authority originally in 1976. Whether we draw on Burns and 
Scapens’ definition of rules as “the formalized statement of procedures” (2000, p.7), or 
Quinn’s (2011) definition of (formal) rules, both definitions would seem to apply to the local 
authority guidelines/costing manual. Thus, we can set out with a starting assumption that 
management accounting practices at both local authorities have been, and continue to be, 
more rules-based. In the first instance, these costing guidelines (i.e. formal rules) 
determine(d) the daily management accounting tasks of clerical staff, who were in the main, 
the staff who allocated (coded) costs incurred to various services provided by each local 
authority. The guidelines provided clear (formal and written) instructions on how costs for 
services were to be recorded within the costing system of each local authority. However, as 
the local authorities began to expand and offer a wider range of services during the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, the written guidelines had to be interpreted (as an informal rule) according to the 
context of the particular local authority. For example, at both BLA and CLA this resulted in 
the creation of new cost codes and internal decisions made on where to allocate revenues and 
expenditures for certain services; and, these “local” changes did not at all feedback to the 
central government costing guidelines. Nor, it would seem, were any such local changes to 
the written central guidelines formally documented at local level – i.e. they were cognitive 
interpretations, or informal rules. Thus, over time, different methods for allocating costs 
emerged at the local authorities, and these methods are more likely to be routines (“the way 
things are done” (Burns and Scapens 2000, pp.7-8)). And, as previously noted the impact of 
these local variants to central government was the emergence, over time, of costing and 
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budget reports which were not comparable between local authorities. The 2006 costing 
manual (see Table 1) provided more detail than previous versions, and thus as Head of 
Finance at BLA put it: 
the principle difference is it is now clearly defined what goes where and 
fundamentally the option that local people had to put costs into a different programme 
is gone. 
 
As mentioned previously, this inconsistent and incompatible cost reporting by local 
authorities led to the introduction of a new “service” costing approach in 1996 which was one 
of the fundamental elements of the local government reform initiative “Better Local 
Government”. A standardized costing manual was provided by central government which set 
out guidelines to ensure consistency and comparability of cost data across all local 
authorities. This led to local authorities altering cost classifications and allocation methods to 
be consistent with the new (2006) costing guidelines. Thus, changes made to the cost codes 
by BLA and CLA were actually acted out by the management accountants in 2006 and 2007. 
However, this new costing structure did not have a major impact on the daily tasks of the 
clerical staff; their task was mainly the same, which was allocating costs to a cost centre. 
However, the linking of cost centre to service provision was done by the software behind the 
scenes so the clerical staff did not “experience” any change in the sense that their daily tasks 
remained as before. According to the management accountant at BLA “we met all the staff 
and I did a presentation to all the areas but we did all the work for them, they had their codes 
so they actually couldn’t probably care less about the new system [of allocating costs]” while 
the management accountant of CLA noted “the primary task of the inputter (clerical staff) is 
mainly the same, so the inputter didn’t really care they just had to do their job and charge it 
correctly”.  
 
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
As revealed earlier, adopting Burns and Scapens (2000) terminology, the costing guidelines 
(both the historic (1976) and new (2006)) appear consistent with the definition of rules, and 
here are considered formal rules. By this we mean, as per Quinn (2011), formal rules are 
written or documented in some fashion. The costing guidelines (original and new) were 
documented and outlined how service costs should be allocated and recorded in the 
accounting system of a local authority. In the case of apparently incomplete 1976 guidelines, 
if a service provided by either BLA or CLA was not typical as envisaged by the guidelines, 
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then management accountants made an internal decision, based on their knowledge, of where 
the service cost should be coded/allocated. In other words, they developed an informal rule 
on how certain things should be done. This is also a rule in the sense envisaged by Burns and 
Scapens (2000), as it suggests a way “things should be done” (pp. 6-7). Here, however, such 
a rule, being a cognitive interpretation of how to do things is regarded as an informal rule; it 
has not been documented in any formal fashion, but is yet an accepted understanding of how 
to perform a particular management accounting task at both BLA and CLA, at a point in time. 
Additionally, the formation of this informal rule in the mind of the actor does not necessarily 
imply that any action has been taken – in other words, a routine does not yet exist. In the case 
of the newer (2006) costing guidelines, these convey a closer match to the reporting 
requirements of a typical present day local authority, at least from the view point of central 
government. However, the initial evidence from interviews suggest that “informal” 
interpretation of the 2006 guidelines can and does occur. As noted by the management 
accountant at BLA “anything that was not in the manual we were given was open to 
interpretation, to human interpretation, of where costs were to go” (see Section 3.2). And, in 
the case of the original 1976 guidelines, the evidence suggests that possibly more informal 
interpretation occurred, as these older guidelines did not develop in line with the expanding 
services of BLA and CLA (see above). 
 
Based on the evidence presented from BLA and CLA above, it seems reasonable to state that 
Irish local authorities exist in a more formal rules-based environment. This, at first glance is 
perhaps an obvious statement, as we might expect organizations such as BLA and CLA to be 
more formal and rule-following. The formal rules governing the authorities are statutory and 
written rules driven by central government, implying local authorities are compelled by 
statute to implement them. However, these formal rules are at an overall general level for all 
local authorities, and even in a small economy like Ireland variations are likely to exist 
among similar organizations. As this research at BLA and CLA has revealed, there may be 
times when some management accounting activities to be carried out by a local authority 
need further interpretation of the formal rules (i.e. costing guidelines), which may result in 
informal rules. This human cognition of the formal rules implies that rules may be fluid and 
incomplete (Morgen and Olsen 2011; Reynaud 2005), and thus informal rules are formed. 
Additionally, the findings from BLA and CLA suggest that both formal and informal rules 
may exist before routines in a local authority setting, which is in contrast to Quinn’s (2011) 
findings as set out in Figure 1,although he does acknowledge rules may precede routines in 
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some instances. To bring our thoughts together, the sequence of events in rules (both formal 
and informal) and routines terminology at BLA and CLA can be depicted as in Figure 2 
(below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – the sequence of rules interpretation and routine formation. 
 
Figure 2 represents the process of the interactions of rules and routines starting at a point in 
time – namely, the introduction of a new formal rule. In Figure 2, we depict the sequence of 
events as evidenced at BLA/CLA in terms of how routinized management accounting 
practices – namely coding/allocating of costs – came about. First, the new formal rule is the 
written guideline(s) as set by central government. These guidelines clearly meet our 
definition of formal rules in that they are written, indeed take on a quasi-legal existence in the 
Irish local government realm. Second, these formal rules (both the original and newer 
guidelines) are cognitively interpreted by actors at each local authority. This interpretation 
has two possible outcomes 1) the formal rules are “complete” and clearly understood and 
Formal rule 
Human cognition 
“Complete” “Incomplete” 
 
Informal rule 
Action 
Routine 
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aligned with the organizational requirements, or 2) the formal rules are interpreted as 
“incomplete”. If the interpretation of rules is clear in the minds of actors, then the “complete” 
rule can be acted out. If organizational actor(s) perceive the formal rules as being insufficient 
in some way compared to the requirements of the organization, an informal rule will evolve 
from the cognitive interpretations of the formal rule, as the actors (at least in the context of 
this study) are required to follow rules. This rule is informal, in that, at least in the cases of 
BLA and CLA the interpretations have not been formalized (i.e. written or documented) in 
any way. Third, when formal rules have been interpreted as either “complete” or 
“incomplete”, then the rules can be acted out, and over time may become routinized - only 
through repeated actions (action being an essential component of routines - see Pentland 
2011; Quinn 2011) can rules, whether formal (unchanged) or informal (interpreted) become 
routines. Thus, it is possible that routines may not actually materialize at the end of the 
process depicted in Figure 2 – hence the dashed lines. 
 
In essence, Figure 2 supports the work of Ortmann (2010), who proposes that rules tell us 
something, but they are, in turn, open to interpretation by actors. Reynaud (2005) proposes 
rules are: 
 
[…] incomplete because each one needs to be applied in the light of knowledge, of 
information contained in other rules, as well as custom, and practice, and context 
(p.850). 
 
Reynaud’s (2005) quote above denotes a possible need for a more complete understanding of 
rules, to include not just human cognition, but also custom and practice (for example, 
routines and habits) and situational context. Thus far, no previous management accounting 
research divides the term “rule” into formal and informal components8 in a detailed study of 
the interactions of rules and routines. Here, the new costing rules which were applied by BLA 
and CLA under statute by central government are, as previously mentioned, considered 
formal rules. However, there are examples of informal rules also (as set out in Figure 2). For 
example, the earlier quote by the Head of Finance BLA (Section 3) highlights this: 
 
                                                 
8 While Burns and Scapens (2000) use the terms “formal” and “informal” they do not apply these to rules in 
their framework. 
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As the services in local authorities evolved over time, individuals within the 
organizations made their own sort of decisions as to where the service costs best sat 
on the document. 
 
Interestingly, this quotation is very similar to evidence found by Lukka (2007), where he 
quotes a Controller of Southlake-Green Corp, USA (p. 95): 
 
 So I think that when using the manuals or doing the reporting, you have to exercise a 
certain amount of common sense. And try to plug things in and where they best fit. 
 
The above quotations demonstrate that formal rules had to be “interpreted” (Morgen and 
Olsen 2011; Reynaud 2005), as we depict in Figure 2. This was certainly the case where 
various costs and services at BLA/CLA did not match the cost allocation rules set out by 
central government. However, as shown by Table 1, with the 2006 costing manual there are 
many divisions, services and sub-services which are clearer than the initial historical 
guidelines from 1976 (see Appendix 2), as noted by the Head of Finance at BLA. Thus, the 
“complete” to action link as depicted in Figure 2 represents instances when the actors at 
BLA/CLA can simply implement the rules as given- without interpretation – and it would 
seem this path through Figure 2 is more likely post 2006. On the other hand, pre-2006, the 
rules set by central government were less detailed and thus “incomplete” and required 
interpretation. Although, the “complete” path is more likely now, we also found evidence of 
“incomplete” formal rules, leading to informal rules after 2006. As reflected on by the 
management accountant at BLA the 2006 guidelines will like their 1976 predecessor, not 
cover every eventuality. Thus, in terms of the interactions of rules with routines, we maintain 
the “incomplete” path in Figure 2.  
 
In comparison to the process set out in Figure 2, Burns and Scapens (2000) consider rules to 
symbolize, to an extent, the formal realm of management accounting (institutions), while 
routines are more representative of the informal realm. Our findings as presented in Figure 2 
suggest that rules may span both the formal and informal realms. We could go further and 
suggest that informal rules may also be considered similar to the ostensive element of the 
routine as described by Quinn (2011) and Feldman and Pentland (2003). The ostensive 
dimension of a routine may have a significant tacit component (which is similar to informal 
rules), it may be codified as a standard procedure (i.e. formal rule) and it may exist as a taken 
for granted norm (comparable to informal rules). However, it must be remembered that the 
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ostensive dimension refers to the routine and, to be deemed a routine, repeated action is 
implied (Becker 2004; Pentland and Feldman 2003, 2008; Pentland 2011). Action, in the 
sense of doing a task, is not part of our definition of informal rules, and although action may 
result following the cognitive interpretation of formal or informal rules and may become a 
routine (see Figure 2), this need not necessarily always happen. In addition, Burns and 
Scapens (2000) do not clarify whether it is rules or routines which initially guide 
management accountants in their daily tasks. Quinn (2011) attempts to clarify this (see Figure 
1) by proposing that ostensive routines are more likely to be in existence before rules.  
 
However, our initial findings suggest that in the interactions of rules and routines, rules may 
precede routines, at least in the context studied here. While it is not possible to draw definite 
conclusions from this research, it would appear that whether rules or routines precede each 
other is dependent to some extent on the context of the organization. If an organization has 
little or no formalized (documented) rules, routines may precede rules as described by Quinn 
(2011). However, in the case of more regulated organizations like BLA and CLA, which are 
primarily driven by formalized rules (in the form of government guidelines and legislation), 
then it appears more likely that rules precede routines in the formation of routinized 
management accounting practices at least in some organizational contexts. Quinn (2011) 
argues that routines are more likely to precede rules in a typical for-profit management 
accounting context, particularly in small and medium-sized businesses. Here, we provide 
initial evidence of the opposite. However, a brief comparison of the work of Quinn (2011) as 
seen in Figure 1, and our work as per Figure 2, does suggest a differing slant on the process 
of how routinized management accounting practices come about in certain contexts through 
the interactions of rules and routines. However, the key underlying principles of Quinn 
(2011), our work here, and Burns and Scapens (2000) remain the same. In other words, the 
interaction of rules and routines is useful to interpret how management accounting practices 
can become routinized over time; we fully support this, but offer a more detailed view of 
these interactions based on our empirical evidence from BLA and CLA.  
 
Reflecting on our research objective, what does Figure 2 mean for our understanding of the 
interactions of rules and routines in a management accounting context? As noted earlier, 
Burns and Scapens (2000) did not necessarily provide clear definitions of either rules or 
routines. Quinn (2011), based on Feldman and Pentland (2003), provides some clarity on the 
nature of routines and some management literature has adopted these more detailed 
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conceptualizations of routines (see van der Steen 2011). However, further conceptualization 
on rules post Burns and Scapens (2000) has been lacking in management accounting 
literature. Here, we have shown that at least in some organizational contexts, formal rules can 
be the trigger for (eventual) management accounting routines. However, the evidence from 
our case organizations as conveyed in Figure 2, supports what Reynaud (2005) and Ortmann 
(2010) propose, in that rules can be interpreted by actors. However, as shown in Figure 2, the 
interpretation of a formal rule cannot be termed a routine, and thus we conceive this 
interpretation as an informal rule – which when acted out may become a routine. Figure 2 
also shows that rules can perhaps be simply enacted, once they are clear (or “complete” in 
our terminology) and are aligned with organizational requirements. Over time, the 
“complete” or “incomplete” (formal or informal) rules may be enacted repetitively and 
become routines. 
 
The work presented here does have a number of limitations. First, the findings of this 
research are limited by the fact that they are interpretative and driven by the context of the 
organizations studied, which may include cultural or country-specific factors. Second, given 
the initial nature of the research, an obvious limitation is the extent of the interviews. Third, 
our framework is based on initial research and thus, to increase the validity of our proposals, 
future research in similar settings is required. Fourth, although we refer to the interactions of 
rules and routines throughout this paper, we have not studied the routines per se in that we 
have not interviewed actors who perform many of the daily management accounting tasks. 
This would of course provide a richer story of change and/or stability, but our objective in the 
first instance is to concentrate on the interactions of rules with routines. It is reasonable to 
assume that if a formal or informal rule is acted out repeatedly over time, it will maintain a 
general pattern of action over time (Pentland 2011). Finally, we do not attempt to delve into 
the human cognition component as depicted in Figure 2. For example, we do not consider the 
sense-making and experiences drawn upon by actor when they interpret a new formal rule. 
Rather, we perhaps somewhat simplistically portray it as part of a process of how routines 
may come about in certain organizational settings. How actors interpret rules may be 
influenced by a myriad of factors such as power/politics, internal and external structures, 
other actors in a network (Stones 2005), the external business/economic environment, 
personal habits, professional background and so on. While this may be a limitation of Figure 
2, it is likely to be a very fruitful future research area. 
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However, while keeping the limitations in mind, this study potentially contributes to the 
continued understanding of concepts drawn on by Burns and Scapens (2000) i.e. rules and 
routines. As with the work of Quinn (2011), this study is by and large supportive of Burns 
and Scapens (2000), but does offer some potential broadening of our understanding of rules 
in particular, and their interaction with routines. Further more detailed studies of more rules-
based organizations like the two local authorities presented here will serve to broaden our 
understanding of the processes of institutionalization and routinization of management 
accounting practices as originally set out by Burns and Scapens (2000). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Interviewee details 
 
Organization Role Length of interview 
CLA Senior Management 
Accountant 
65 mins 
CLA Junior Management 
Accountant 
72 mins 
BLA Head of Finance 85 mins, 61 mins 
BLA Management 
Accountant 
92 mins, 65 mins 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Programme Group Programme  
1. Housing and Building 1.1 Local Authority Housing 
  1.2 Assistance to Persons Housing  
themselves 
1.3 Assistance to Persons Improving Houses 
1.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
2. Road Transportation and Safety 2.1 Road Upkeep 
2.2 Road Improvement 
2.3 Road Traffic 
2.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
3. Water Supply and Sewerage 3.1 Public Water Supply Schemes 
3.2 Public Sewerage Schemes 
3.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
4. Development Incentives  and Controls 4.1 Land Use Planning 
4.2 Industrial Development 
4.3 Other Development and Promotion 
4.5 Director of Community & Enterprise 
4.6 Twinning of Local Authority Areas 
4.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
5. Environmental Protection 5.1 Waste Disposal 
5.2 Burial Grounds 
5.3 Safety of Structures and Places 
5.4 Fire Protection 
5.5 Pollution Control 
5.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
6. Recreation and Amenity 6.1 Swimming Pools 
6.2 Libraries 
6.3 Parks, Open Spaces, etc 
6.4 Other Recreation and Amenity 
6.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
7. Education, Health and Welfare 7.2 Education 
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7.3 Health and Welfare 
7.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
8. Miscellaneous Services 8.3 Financial Management 
8.4 Elections 
8.5 Justice and Consumer Protection 
8.6 Property Damage 
8.7 Markets and Abattoir 
8.8 Administration and Miscellaneous 
8.9 Lord Mayor’s Allowance 
8.10 Lord Mayor’s Entertainment & Travel 
Allowance etc 
8.11 Expenses of Members of Local 
Authority & Representation at Conferences 
8.12 Expenses of Members Attending 
Conferences. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Structure
EXISTING VS. NEW  COSTING STRUCTURE
Programme 
Group
Programme 
Sub
Programme 
Sub
Sub
Programme 
Division
Job/Cost Centre
(Business Unit)
Sub 
Sub
Service
Sub 
Service
Service
 
 
